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Heller and Hobbs (2014) provide an incisive analysis of
the challenges inherent in setting endpoint states as conservation goals. The social construct of nature, nonequilibrium ecosystems, global climate change, large-scale
transformations of the landscape, and increasing population and economic activity confound efforts to establish conservation goals. Stakeholders often disagree on
endpoint targets, whereas competing notions of historic
fidelity and future flexibility frustrate our ability to articulate success, never mind actually achieve it. As Heller and
Hobbs describe, this leaves managers in the bind of finding the “balance between future-looking management
emphasizing change and past-looking management emphasizing persistence.” As a result, decisions over when
and how to intervene are particularly difficult.
In place of endpoint goals, Heller and Hobbs call
for management intervention known as natural practice
(NP), which emphasizes less intensive methods and embodies an ethic of virtue. This approach is both problematic and promising.
It is problematic because it ignores the very challenge
Heller and Hobbs have so well identified. They propose
NP as a substitute for managing with endpoint targets,
but then do the exact opposite. In describing how to
apply an NP approach, they claim that NP “may be best
suited for conservation areas committed to the preservation of holistic nature and wilderness, rather than single
species targets.” Wilderness preservation is nothing if
not an endpoint goal. Indeed, difficult though they may
be to set, endpoint goals are inescapable in conservation. The NP framework suggests useful questions to ask
when intervening, but it cannot answer the more fundamental challenges of whether to intervene and why.
For that, one needs to know what is being managing
for—the endpoint. Endpoint goals, athough difficult to

set, will necessarily play a role in conservation. But arguments and uncertainty over endpoints need not halt
action.
Although it does not solve the fundamental challenge
of setting endpoint goals, Heller and Hobbs’ proposal
for NP holds promise. Their approach can draw from
decades of experience in pollution control guided by
a similar strategy, known as best management practice
(BMP) or best available technology (BAT). The practice of
abating emissions at a specific source without knowing
exactly how it affects broader endpoint goals allowed
pollution control law to move forward, even as the establishment of endpoint objectives remained contentious.
The NP approach may similarly help managers act despite
pervasive uncertainty over endpoint goals.
Environmental law has always employed ambientbased standards and aspirational goals as endpoints.
These are evident in water quality standards that articulate the uses that a water body will support and the
broader goals of fishable, swimmable waters (16 U.S.C.
§ 1251 and 1313). The day-to-day management of environmental quality, however, relies not on these endpoint
goals, but on a practice approach that all users of the
environment should engage in cautionary or remedial
steps to avoid degradation. Requiring polluters to use
BAT or BMP, regardless of a traceable impact, avoided
the difficulties of identifying the site-specific mechanisms
by which many small contributors to environmental
degradation combined to create human health problems
and ecological impairment (Houck 1994; Babich 2003).
Technology-based limitations for discharges to waters
from point sources of pollution (and their counterparts
in air and soil contamination) profoundly transformed
environmental law and remain the most widely used tools
in the environmental manager’s kit.
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As Heller and Hobbs note, such a shift from endpoint
goal attainment to a practice-based approach involves
ethics as well as management. In pollution control, abating discharges without mandating across-the-board improved practices demands proof of causation to ensure
that no one has to incur costs unless a preponderance
of the evidence traces an activity directly to a harm
(Fischman 2008). A related utilitarian principle would
find justification for imposing costs only where benefits
outweigh them (Sagoff 1988). Ambient-based standards
establish the environmental quality desired while permitting so-called efficient pollution that does not prevent their attainment. The release of a contaminant in an
amount that causes less harm than would be caused by
abating the emission is an example of efficient pollution.
The endpoint goal approach asks managers to focus on
the larger consequences of their actions. But multiple,
interacting causes—often with latent consequences unperceivable for a long time—make proof of causation
infeasible in most cases. This difficulty led lawmakers to
require economically practical steps to be taken without
linking cause to endpoint effects in any particular place.
Asking all actors to act with consideration of possible
effects (e.g., through BAT), regardless of a traceable impact on the endpoint goals, is a Kantian, deontological
ethic of right action (Sagoff 1988). This reflects a similar
ethical stance to the one Heller and Hobbs offer for NP:
acting out of the virtues that reflect conservation (e.g.,
humility). In the case of pollution control, humility requires abating similar dischargers in a like manner because of only modest understanding of the ultimate
causes of environmental quality impairment. The conflicts between utilitarian and deontological approaches to
conservation have spurred many scholarly debates (e.g.,
Daly 1995). But, in the practical realm of management and
implementation, both principles coexist. Indeed, they are
mutually supportive.
There are a few lessons from environmental law that
may help advance Heller and Hobbs’ project. First,
process-based standards for action are especially valuable
because they do not require much tailoring to particular circumstances. Although place-based variations in
treatments are important, insisting on too much tailoring undermines the advantage of uniform practices. It is
better to shift the burden to demonstrate the need for a
variance from a BMP than to require managers to show
why the practice offers advantages in a particular application. Dischargers subject to a BAT standard under the
U.S. Clean Water Act may obtain a modification from the
practice-based requirements for certain nonconventional
pollutants if they can show that, among other things,
the modification will not interfere with the attainment of
water quality standards (33 U.S.C. § 1311[g][2]). A similar
approach might require loggers to leave a certain width of
uncut areas along creeks unless they can demonstrate that

Conservation Biology
Volume 00, No. 0, 2015

Pollution Control Lessons

a narrower strip would yield sufficient progress toward
aquatic endpoint goals.
In addressing air pollution, the causation problems are
even more vexing because the behavior of the atmosphere is more difficult to model than water flows. Here,
the law employs both a BAT approach (e.g., through New
Source Performance Standards for categories of stationary
sources) and an ambient-based approach (through the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards applied in state
implementation plans) (42 U.S.C. §§ 7409 & 7411).
This dual strategy leads to our second point: processbased standards should serve as floors for environmental
management, not ceilings. Under the Clean Water Act,
technology-based limitations are required in almost all
circumstances, even if it is unclear whether they translate into a contribution toward achieving ambient water
quality standards. When BAT standards are inadequate
to ensure water quality, agencies must impose additional
restrictions (33 U.S.C. § 1312). Similarly, although NP
may be a good way to assess interventions, additional
action may be needed to achieve specific goals, such as
sustaining a local population of a desired species.
For example, although the U.S. Endangered Species Act
(ESA) prohibits activities that result in injury to individuals of a listed species as a result of habitat modification,
the issues of proof often thwart enforcement (Fischman
2008). In an attempt to promote recovery without having
to prove an endpoint violation, the federal government
has sought to incorporate some process-based tools to
protect species from private actions. For example, a recent rule for the Lesser Prairie-Chicken (Tympanuchus
pallidicinctus) shields from ESA liability oil drillers operating in accordance with the BMP contained in a conservation plan (Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service 2014). If the practices fail to abate the decline of
the prairie-chicken population, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service will need to promulgate a new rule. A better
process-based standard would incorporate a response to
continued population decline in the rule itself. For example, if the BMP fails to prevent population decline, then
the rule might require a temporary reduction in drilling
density while BMPs undergo review and adjustment.
A weakness of process-based abatement in pollution
control law offers a lesson for adoption of NP in conservation. Chemical concentrations are relatively easy to
measure and provide numerical standards for evaluating
whether endpoint objectives are achieved. But many water quality goals are biological (33 U.S.C. § 1251[a]). The
BAT approach has often served, in practice, as both the
floor and ceiling in aquatic restoration because standards
defining the endpoint goals for the biological integrity
of waters are too vague (Adler 2003). Implementation
of the Clean Water Act operated on autopilot, requiring
BATs without much regard for whether these practices
sufficiently restored biological integrity. Only recently

Fischman & Salzman

have ecological problems, such as excess nutrients in
the Chesapeake Bay or Gulf of Mexico, spurred greater
attention to controlling the threats to biological objectives that have not been addressed through BAT. Still
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has required
very few numerical criteria to measure progress toward
biological objectives (Houck 2014). NP in conservation
addresses precisely this situation, where endpoint goals
are imprecise at best and self-contradictory at worst. A
corollary of the second lesson, then, is that difficult-todefine objectives are nonetheless important ceilings that
demand greater attention to keep the practice-based actions on track to achieve biological goals. This requires
managers to reconcile competing visions for conservation by establishing goals and to translate the goals into
technical criteria that can be monitored. As difficult as
this task may be, it remains essential to all environmental
policy, including conservation.
Third, many best practices may be decidedly low tech.
For instance, nonpoint source contributions to water
quality impairment are often controlled with buffer strips
of planted vegetation or grading. Simple, clear BMPs
for conducting agriculture, silviculture, and even residential and commercial development may prove most
effective in reducing the myriad stressors on protected
areas from the surrounding matrix of more intensively
modified, nonconservation lands. For example, although
oil and gas extraction technology is complex, the best
conservation practices are often simple tweaks. Limiting drilling to 1 rig/section (sections are 1 square mile),
with surface impacts on <3% of the area, in places with
Sage Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) leks is easy
to implement and monitor (Sage-grouse National Technical Team 2011). Similarly, screening openings in heatertreaters used in the oil extraction industry is a simple
practice that improves migratory bird conservation (U.S.
Court of Appeals 2010).

3

Heller and Hobbs’ NP model provides a promising
approach to moving forward incrementally in the face
of uncertainty. The lessons from pollution control caution that biological goals, fuzzy though they may be,
remain important polestars for management. NP may
be imperfect, but it is a sensible and meaningful direction in which to nudge conservation if paired with
meaningful objectives.
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